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THE REGULATION OF AIRLINE MERGERS BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
LUCILE S. KEYES*
INTRODUCTION: THE LEGAL MANDATE
U NDER THE ORIGINAL Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938,1 and for forty years following its passage, federal
regulation of airline mergers and acquisitions differed
sharply from the regulation of such transactions under the
general antitrust laws. The 1938 Act provided that a pro-
posed merger or acquisition was to be approved by the
Civil Aeronautics Board unless it found that the proposal
would "not be consistent with the public interest," subject
to the proviso that no transaction was to be approved
"which would result in creating a monopoly or monopo-
lies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize an-
other air carrier not a party" to the transaction.2 In
determining consistency with the public interest, the stat-
ute required the Board to consider a number of factors,
including competition.3 Competition, however, was not
accorded any special weight.4 Moreover, the Board's ap-
proval carried with it automatic immunity from prosecu-
* B.A. 1940, Wellesley College; M.A. 1942; Ph.D. 1948, Radcliffe College.
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (repealed by
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 31 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. app.)).
2 Id. at 52 Stat. 1001-02.
Id. at 1002-03. The Board was required to consider the possibility of inter-
locking relationships, profits from the sale of securities, and loans and financial
aid. Id.
Id. The Act provided that the Board "may, upon its own initiative or upon
complaint by an air carrier," investigate competition. Id.
737
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tion under the antitrust laws.5 Antitrust standards,
therefore, quite properly did not decisively affect the
Board's regulation of mergers.6
The Airline Deregulation Act of 19787 accords far more
weight to traditional antitrust standards, but at the same
time allows for an "efficiencies defense," commonly re-
ferred to as the so-called "Bank Merger Act defense,"
which may or may not be presently valid under the gen-
eral antitrust laws. 8 Under the new law, the Board may
still not approve a proposed transaction which it finds to
be inconsistent with the public interest. 9 However, the
Board must apply two additional tests (known as the "an-
titrust tests"). The first is the "Sherman Act" test,' 0
which forbids approval of any proposal which "would re-
sult in a monopoly or would be in furtherance of any com-
bination or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to
monopolize the business of air transportation in any re-
gion of the United States."" The second, or "Clayton
Act" test, 12 forbids approval of any proposal:
[T]he effect of which in any region of the United States
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would
be in restraint of trade, unless the Board finds that the an-
Id. at 1004.
6 Merger regulation under the old law is reviewed in Keyes, Notes on the History
of Federal Regulation of Airline Mergers, 37 J. AIR L. & COMM. 357 (1971).
7 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C. app.).
1 The "efficiencies defense" is a type of argument used by merger proponents
seeking to show that the anticompetitive effects of their proposals will be out-
weighed by their beneficial effects on the efficiency of the merged enterprise. The
"Bank Merger Act defense" takes its name from an analogous provision in the
Bank Merger Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828 (1982)). The Department of Justice apparently takes the view that this
defense is valid under the general antitrust laws. See Keyes, Revised Guidelines -
1984, REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Summer, 1984. However, the
Supreme Court appears to have taken the opposite view on at least one occasion.
See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
9 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (Supp. 11 1978).
10 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
1 49 U.S.C. app. § 1378(b)(1)(A) (1982).
12 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982).
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ticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are out-
weighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the
transaction in meeting significant transportation conve-
niences and needs of the public, and unless it finds that
such significant transportation conveniences and needs
may not be satisfied by a reasonably available alternative
having materially less anticompetitive effects.' 3
Opponents of the transaction must "bear the burden of
proving the anticompetitive effects," while proponents
must "bear the burden of proving that it meets the signifi-
cant transportation conveniences and needs of the public
and that such conveniences and needs may not be satis-
fied by a less anticompetitive alternative." 14 Antitrust im-
munity may be granted, but only after a finding that it is
required in the public interest, and only "to the extent
necessary to enable [participants] to proceed with the
transaction specifically approved . . . and those transac-
tions necessarily contemplated" by the order of
approval.1 5
The Civil Aeronautics Board continued to regulate air-
line mergers until the end of 1984. At that time, the duty
of merger regulation was transferred to the Department
of Transportation (DOT) with no change in the underly-
ing statutory mandate. 16 The same legislation further
provided that special treatment of airline mergers and
similar intercarrier transactions would terminate at the
end of 1988,17 but also directed the Secretary of Trans-
portation to make recommendations regarding the future
of special treatment in a report (to be submitted before
,- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1378(b)(1)(B) (1982).
14 Id.
'- Id. § 1384.
' Merger approval authority was originally transferred to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) effective January 1, 1985. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(b)(1)(C) (1982).
This authority was transferred yet again, this time to the DOT, with the same
effective date. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(b)(1)(c) (Supp. III 1985). According to the
DOT, both it and the DOJ "generally opposed" the transfer. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, REPORT TO CONGRESS: ADMINISTRATION OF AVIATION ANTITRUST
FUNCTIONS 4 (1987) [hereinafter DOT REPORT].
7 49 U.S.C. app. § 1384 (Supp. III 1985).
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July 1, 1987) which was also to review the Department's
own performance of its "antitrust" functions.18
The Department's report, made public in May, 1987,
not only supports the termination of special treatment but
recommends that this step be taken immediately, stating:
Since the airline industry is a mature, deregulated indus-
try, it should be treated like other industries. Without sec-
tion 408, airline transactions will be subject to notice and
review procedures .. .which are more effective and less
burdensome than those required by section 408. Experi-
ence has demonstrated that application of the antitrust
laws is far better suited to the dynamic needs of a competi-
tive industry than the prior approval requirements im-
posed by the Federal Aviation Act. The repeal of sections
408 and 409, moreover, will provide for a more efficient
use of government resources, for airline transactions
would no longer require simultaneous review by two sepa-
rate departments. 9
This recommendation seems entirely justified, since there
appears to be no valid argument for applying a specially
tailored antitrust policy to mergers between airlines. °
The Department's review of its regulatory experience 2'
leaves much to be desired. The summary treatment ac-
corded this experience, although a useful guide for fur-
ther investigation, provides little insight into the
underlying rationale of the Department's decisions and
does not deal with the serious antitrust issues involved.
Whether or not special antitrust treatment is abandoned,
these issues will retain their practical importance. As will
be seen, the merger decisions have turned solely upon cri-
teria which are also contained in the general antitrust
laws. The precedents established by the DOT can there-
fore be expected to remain relevant even if special regula-
,8 Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1705 (1984).
"9 DOT REPORT, supra note 16, at 22.
20 The legislative history in this area appears to contain no valid argument for
the special treatment of airline mergers. See Keyes, A Preliminary Appraisal of Merger
Control under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 46J. AIR LAw & CoMM. 71 (1980).
21 DOT REPORT, supra note 16, at 5-13.
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tion is abolished. Moreover, the present DOJ has been in
basic agreement with DOT's historic economic analysis of
competition in the airline industry.22 More generally, a
study of the DOT's experience should be a continuing
help to those who make antitrust policy, if only by en-
abling them to avoid past errors.
A review of merger decisions under the Deregulation
Act indicates that both the Board and the Department
have devoted most of their attention to the competitive
effects of proposals brought before them. The result,
however, has been that in practically every case consid-
ered since 1978, the DOT has granted approval on the
ground that the opposing parties were unable to carry
their burden of showing a reasonable probability of sub-
stantial reduction of competition. The two notable excep-
tions occurred relatively early in the history of regulation
under the new Act. In one case, the proposal in question
was resubmitted and approved less than two years later.23
In the other, the proposal was turned down, without a de-
tailed decision concerning its merits, at a time when the
Board was about to announce its decision permitting ac-
quisition of the sought-after carrier (National Airlines) by
other parties.2 4 More recently, merger activity has been
exceptionally high. Especially notable is the large group
of major transactions approved in the last two years.25
22 See, e.g., Northwest-Republic Acquisition Case, Docket No. 43,754, Recom-
mended Decision of the Administrative Law Judge (June 17, 1986), at 23-24 (not-
ing that all parties, including the DOJ, accepted the theory that open entry would
effectively prevent emergence of market power in any airline market).
2- Continental-Western Merger Case, dismissed by DOT Order No. 79-9-185
(Aug. 14, 1979); approved by DOT Order Nos. 81-6-1/2 (March 31, 1981).
24 Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc., for Approval of Acquisition of Control
of National Airlines, Inc., DOT Order No. 79-12-74 (Dec. 13, 1979).
25 See, e.g., AIRLINE ECONOMICS, INC., AIRLINE CONSOLIDATION: WHERE IT
STANDS - WHAT'S TO COME (1987), where it is noted that "[o]ver 25 mergers and
acquisitions have occurred since late 1985, 23 by Major (large) carriers; four Ma-
jor carriers: People Express, Eastern, Republic, and Western, were acquired in
1986 - only nine of the former 13 Major carriers remain; every one of the nine
remaining Majors have been involved in a merger or acquisition in the past two
years. Together they hold nearly 95% of the market today." Id. at 1. Of course,
brisk merger activity and/or high national concentration does not in itself imply
lax administration of merger law or any need for tighter legislation.
1988]
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The "Bank Merger Act defense," with its implied case-by-
case weighing of "transportation conveniences and
needs" against anticompetitive effects, has not played a
part in the actual administration of the law.
The following discussion will focus on the line of rea-
soning which has led to these somewhat surprising re-
sults. After all, legislation deliberately applying antitrust
regulation to airline mergers would lead one to believe
that Congress expected some proposed transactions to
have a substantial anticompetitive impact, and the provi-
sion for a "Bank Merger Act defense" would suggest an
expectation that on some occasion this defense would be
needed and used. The cases to be considered here have
all been decided since the beginning of 1985, when juris-
diction passed to the DOT. As will be seen, however, the
agency's interpretation of the law appears to be quite con-
sistent with that of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Although
not all merger decisions in this period are discussed, the
coverage is broad enough to give an accurate picture of
DOT policy.26
EARLY DECISIONS: THE POLICY ANNOUNCED
In its first important opinion after assuming jurisdiction
over airline mergers,27 the DOT clearly indicated that it
did not anticipate that airline mergers, even among com-
peting carriers, would ordinarily produce anticompetitive
consequences. Announcing its "tentative" decision to fol-
low the lead of the Civil Aeronautics Board in evaluating
competition, the DOT rejected the market share criteria
21) Of the twelve transactions on which the Department issued final decisions
between January 1, 1985 and May 1, 1987, nine are dealt with here. The excep-
tions are Midway-Air Florida Show-Cause Order, DOT Order No. 85-4-3 (April 1,
1985) where the "failing company" doctrine was clearly applicable; Joint Applica-
tion of U.S. Air Group, Inc. and Pacific Southwest Airlines, DOT Order No. 87-3-
11 (Mar. 4, 1987), and Joint Application of American Airlines, Inc. and ACI Hold-
ings, Inc., DOT Order No. 87-3-80 (Mar. 30, 1987). None of these decisions de-
parts from the DOT's usual policy line or throws additional light on its meaning.
21 Southwest-Muse Acquisition Show Cause Order, DOT Order No. 85-5-28
(May 10, 1985).
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widely employed in general antitrust analyses. 28 In sup-
port of this rejection, the DOT cited the CAB's well-
known statement that "[a]irline markets are nearly always
concentrated by traditional antitrust standards, yet most
are competitive in performance, ' 29 so that other factors
must be considered to determine whether a proposed
transaction would confer market power3 0 (power to raise
prices or reduce service profitably) upon the surviving
carrier.3 ' In this connection, the regulator, according to
the DOT, must focus his attention upon the ease or diffi-
culty of entry into the affected markets. In the words of
the DOT:
In a regulated environment, air carriers are free to enter
or leave domestic markets at will. In addition, the primary
capital asset of the air transportation industry, aircraft, is
highly mobile. In the absence of restraints on entry, the
threat of new entry will ordinarily curb the exercise of
market power by an incumbent to increase prices or re-
duce service, even when that incumbent enjoys a substan-
tial market share. However, as the Board recognized,
factors such as restraints on airport access may insulate an
incumbent carrier from competitive forces by making new
entry more difficult or time consuming. Likewise, other
factors, such as the importance of feed traffic or other effi-
ciencies from hubbing, may make new entry more expen-
sive, or at least more risky. Such factors may also insulate
an incumbent carrier from competitive forces and permit
the exercise of market power.32
Taking a second look at the "insulating factors," the
DOT, again following the Board's lead, indicated that
they may not be very significant after all. The DOT found
2s Id. at 5.
Y!, See, e.g., National Airlines Acquisition, 84 C.A.B. 408, 420 (1979) (CAB stating
that it will not rely heavily on market share data because such data has not been
particularly helpful in establishing probable competitive performance).
.' Market power is commonly defined as the power to raise prices or reduce
services profitably while restricting the entry of competitors. See, e.g., Alpert, Is
Market Structure Proof of Market Power?, 19 MERGERS & AcquiSITIONs 47 (1984).
.' Southwest-Muse, Order No. 85-5-28, at 6.
.'2 Id. at 6-7.
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that although "the presence of a hub operation at a city
can affect the relative efficiencies of an incumbent carrier
vis-a-vis a potential entrant in city-pair markets involving
a hub . . . other factors - such as hubbing at the other
end of a city pair, low cost structures, or access to local
and interline feed traffic -can overcome the efficiency ef-
fects of hubbing."' "3 The fact that facilities are not avail-
able from the airport operator at a given airport, because
they are fully leased, need not be a barrier. Unless the
existing facilities are held by one or few airlines, subleases
may be obtained. 4
Furthermore, the Department echoed the Board in ar-
guing that there is no need to fear a reduction of competi-
tion simply because one would-be merger partner is a
potential competitor of the other in one or more city-pair
markets, except "where [the market in question] is not
performing in a fully competitive fashion and the poten-
tial entrant lost through the merger is one of a very few
potential entrants. ' 35 The merits of the Department's po-
sition regarding the anticompetitive impact of mergers
will, in general, not be considered until the concluding
section. This treatment of the elimination of a potential
competitor seems especially questionable, however, be-
cause: (1) "fully competitive" performance may well be
the result of the existence of potential competition; and
(2) unless there is governmental control of entry, poten-
tial entrants are always numerous in principle but individ-
. Id. at 12.
.14 Id. at 13. "The Board recognized that the need to sublease airport facilities
does not become an entry barrier unless there are only one or a few carriers that
control all of an airport's facilities. . . . In that situation, an incumbent might
decide that the potential for lost air transportation revenues diverted to a new
entrant would outweigh revenues to be gained from leasing facilities. However,
when there are more than a small number of carriers, the danger that incumbents
will block entry for competitive reasons is much lower. Absent collusion, an in-
cumbent cannot readily assume that its refusal to sublease to a new entrant will
deny access to the airport and thereby protect its air transporation revenues from
diversion. Market forces can be relied on to assure that a new entrant will be able
to negotiate a sublease." Id.
s Id. at 10.
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ual potential entrants do not have the same capacity to
impose competitive discipline.
Since the Department had "tentatively" concluded that
Muse was in dire financial straits and the merger would
have qualified for approval under the "failing company"
doctrine 36 if such approval had been sought by the appli-
cants, resolution of the case did not require any extensive
discussion of its anticompetitive impact.3 7 Although the
prospective participants in the merger competed in a
number of city-pair markets (including several where they
offered the only services between airport pairs with dis-
tinctive advantages in convenience as compared with
available substitutes), and although both maintained hubs
at Dallas and Houston, no anticompetitive effect was ex-
pected because Muse was on the point of leaving the
scene anyway. 38 Nevertheless, the Department seized this
early opportunity to announce its support of the general
view that airline mergers do not ordinarily result in a sub-
stantial reduction of competition, regardless of the ex-
isting or potential market relationships between the
would-be participants.
The DOT's next important decision, which approved
United Airlines' purchase of Pan American's Pacific Divi-
sion as an operating entity, involved international markets
subject to a type of official entry control unknown in
United States domestic air transportation. 39 These con-
trols, together with the superior resources and traffic ac-
cess possessed by United as compared with Pan American,
caused the DOT to conclude that the United States-Japan
and United States-Far East markets were "likely to be-
- The "failing company" doctrine is a type of defense used by merger propo-
nents seeking to show that their proposed transactions are necessary to prevent
the failure of one of the participant firms. Thus, it may be argued that competi-
tion between the participants would be eliminated even if the merger would not
proceed, so that the merger itself will not reduce competition. It may also be
argued that the merger will produce a social benefit by preventing the wasteful
liquidation of a going concern.
37 Southwest-Muse, Order No. 85-5-28, at 5.
38 Id. at 11.
is, Pacific Division Transfer Case, DOT Order No. 85-11-67 (November 4, 1985).
19881 745
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come significantly more competitive," as a result of the
transfer of Pan American's operating rights to United, in
spite of the limited amount of competition between the
two carriers in these markets. 40 The decision appears to
throw no light on domestic acquisition policy and there-
fore will not be considered further. Some have suggested
that the decision affected domestic policy by forcing ap-
proval of further acquisitions. 41  However, it seems that
the decisions allegedly so affected were, as will be seen,
entirely consonant with existing domestic policy and
therefore in need of no special ad hoc explanation.
The competition analysis in Piedmont-Empire Acquisition
Show Cause Proceeding42 emphasizes the Department's view
that elimination of specific potential competitors is gener-
ally of minor significance. The analysis again follows
precedents established by the CAB. Three types of geo-
graphic markets were recognized as relevant: (1) the na-
tion; (2) city pairs; and (3) individual points served.43 In
each case, the "product" was defined as scheduled pas-
40 Id. at 4.
While structural factors (chiefly, barriers to entry and expansion by
new and fringe competitors) are relatively restrictive in these mar-
kets, the overriding fact is that they apply to United just as to other
would-be or fringe competitors. The barriers do not limit JAL Uapan
Air Lines], Northwest, and Pan American in the same way. The fact
that the barriers to competition in the relevant markets do not have
the same impact on all carriers, together with the fact that the rele-
vant markets are growing rapidly, means that, absent substantial ad-
ditional operational flexibility, United's competitive significance in
the relevant markets would likely diminish over the near future, if
this transaction were disapproved. Moreover, based on its financial
and operating strengths, the transaction may enable United to pro-
vide stronger competition than Pan American and United now can
separately.
ld.
41 The Economist, Nov. 1, 1986, at 24, reports that Professor Alfred E. Kahn
has asserted that the Pacific Division purchase "made it impossible to deny North-
west-Orient the right to gobble up Republic .. .so a chain of mergers, acquisi-
tions and marketing deals were sanctioned that removed much of the local
competition for passengers and then trapped them into a particular carrier's
network."
42 DOT Order No. 85-12-17 (Dec. 9, 1985).
4 id. at 5.
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senger air transportation.44 A similar position had already
been "tentatively" endorsed in Southwest-Muse.45 The
combined post-merger share of traffic in the national mar-
ket was found to be suitably small. 46 In the only city-pair
market where the carriers both offered nonstop service,
their combined market share was calculated to be four
percent and competitive nonstop service was provided by
four major airlines in addition to commuter airlines. Be-
tween other city pairs served by both, the connecting ser-
vice offered by one was "significantly less convenient than
the other's nonstop service."' 47 At none of the twelve
points served by both Empire and Piedmont would the
merger result in "dominance" by the combined carrier.48
At Baltimore, where Piedmont's "dominant" share of en-
planements would rise from 44.1 percent to 44.4 percent,
there was "[n]o indication that other carriers would be
unable to begin or extend service" and approximately
nine carriers were already operating.49 Similar conditions
existed at four other points where the combined carrier
would account for more than ten percent of en-
planements.5 °
As the evidence shows, the immediate effect of the ac-
quisition, measured in terms of loss of competitive ser-
vice, was not large. Nevertheless, the evidence also
strongly suggests that Empire was well placed to be a
source of new competition especially in Piedmont's local
markets, and to respond in those markets to any slacken-
ing or overpricing of the existing service. These consider-
4, Id.
4. Southwest-Muse, Order No. 85-5-28, at 7.
4. Piedmont-Empire Show Cause, Order No. 85-12-17, at 5. The Piedmont-Empire
merger would result in "a combined national market share considerably smaller
than the national market share created by several other recently approved airline
mergers." Id. (citation omitted).
47 Id. at 6.
48 Id. at 6-8.
4 Id. at 7.
.- Id. Although the combined Piedmont-Empire carrier would account for
more than ten percent of enplanements at these points, the combined carrier
would still not be "dominant." Id.
1988] 747
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ations were characteristically ignored, in line with the
Department's view that this sort of potential competition
was irrelevant unless the affected market's performance
was already not "fully competitive" and the to-be-extin-
guished firm was one of only a very few potential
competitors.
The direct economic effect of the decision in Horizon-
Cascade Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding5' was apparently
negligible. However, the opinion contained an important
explanation of the DOT's general policy of merger regu-
lation. Here, the to-be-acquired carrier was bankrupt and
was continuing to operate only because of funds provided
by the would-be acquirer.2 It would seem, therefore, that
the transaction would not eliminate any existing or poten-
tial competition. The Department took this occasion,
however, to elaborate its view that the elimination of a
viable competitor, will not "ordinarily" permit the survi-
vor to exercise "market power" because of the threat of
new entry.53 Even though Horizon and Cascade were di-
rect competitors in eleven nonstop markets and in nine of
these there were no others, the DOT found that in view of
the general absence of entry barriers, "potential airline
competition [could] prevent the exercise of market
power." '
54
Most notably, in response to evidence indicating that
airline fare levels tend to vary inversely with the number
of actual competitors in a given market, the DOT never-
theless concluded that a reduction in the number of actual
competitors did not imply a "reduction in competition. 55
The DOT stated "that fares are likely to be lower in mar-
51 DOT Order No. 86-1-43 (Jan. 22, 1986). The tentative approval was made
final on January 30, 1986. Horizon-Cascade Acquisition Show Cause Proceeding
Final Order, DOT Order No. 86-1-67 (Jan. 30, 1986).
-'2 Horizon-Cascade Show Cause, Order No. 86-1-43, at 3.
.3 The DOT did not consider the applicability of the "failing company" doc-
trine to this case because the applicants failed to provide the required documenta-
tion. Id. at 11.
- Id. at 7.
-s- Id. at 10. The State of Washington, opposing the merger, felt that the mar-
kets were "too thin to support competition." Id. The DOT responded by stating
AIRLINE MERGERS
kets with actual competition, but potential competition
should keep fares close to competitive levels." ' 56 As an in-
dicator of what the Department meant by the term
"close," it declared with apparent satisfaction that
"[s]ome commentators believe that the difference in fares
between concentrated and overconcentrated markets is
no more than ten percent. 57
LATER DECISIONS: FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES
Each of the next two merger decisions had a far more
significant immediate impact on competition in the do-
mestic market than those discussed above. Both con-
cerned carriers with extensive competitive overlaps. In
both cases, the merger proponents operated hubs at the
same cities. Unlike Southwest-Muse, neither case involved a
moribund participant. These two decisions highlight the
difficulties faced by merger opponents under the DOT's
interpretation of the law.
As described by the Administrative Law Judge, pre-
merger competition between Northwest Airlines and Re-
public Airlines, two vigorous and viable carriers, was
extensive:
The Department of Justice has identified 97 city pairs af-
fected by the proposed acquisition. These markets in-
clude 26 Minneapolis-St. Paul [MSP] and 12 Detroit city-
pairs in which both Northwest and Republic provide non-
stop service.... In addition, 53 city-pairs emanating from
one of these two hubs are served by one carrier and not
the other: At MSP, Republic serves 15 .. .and Northwest
6 ... not served by the other merger partner; at Detroit,
Republic serves 32 Detroit city-pairs not served by North-
west .... Rounding out the 97 city pairs, DOJ identifies 6
non-Minneapolis/Detroit city-pair markets that are served
that, if the state were correct, "they would not receive competitive service on a
long-term basis, even if we disapproved the acquisition." Id.
.- Id.
.57 Id. at 10- 11 (citation omitted).
7491988]
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nonstop by both carriers.58
As the judge also noted, the evidence unmistakably
showed that Northwest's president believed that one of
the merger's main benefits to the participants would come
"from the elimination of excess competition, vis-a-vis
each other."59 Nevertheless, the judge felt compelled to
recommend approval of the transaction on the ground
that "no party ha[d] sustained the burden of proving that
the proposed merger [would] substantially reduce compe-
tition in any relevant market."' 60 In fact, no party, not
even the Department ofJustice, argued that the extensive
elimination of competitive services amounted to "an-
ticompetitive effects" within the meaning of the law. Ac-
cording to the judge, all parties agreed that:
"free entry into domestic markets under the Deregulation
Act raises the possibility that any carrier can enter any
market to replace the loss of competition by removal of
Republic or Northwest and that such entry will discipline
the market and prevent the incumbent from exercising
monopoly or market power by exacting supracompetitive
prices or reducing service below competitive levels.6'
Acceptance of this view, the judge believed, "would ap-
pear in fact to render the burden of proof attaching to a
merger opponent almost insurmountable. ' 62 Barriers to
market entry were regarded as necessary for the existence
of anticompetitive effects. Traditional entry barriers such
as facilities and slot constraints were ordinarily absent. It
would, therefore, be difficult indeed for opponents to
prove that entry in any affected market would be unlikely
to occur, and thus that anticompetitive consequences
were probable. In Northwest-Republic, for example, where
no "traditional" entry barriers existed, the DOJ at-
.1 Northwest-Republic Acquisition Case, DOT Docket No. 43,754, Recom-
mended Decision of the Administrative Law Judge (June 17, 1986), at 23-24.
Id. at 18 n.40.
Id. at 5.
oi Id. at 18.
62 Id. at 19.
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tempted to show that replication of Republic's hub would
be required to discipline competition in some of the MSP
city pairs, and that this could not be accomplished, in part
because of airport capacity limitations. The judge appar-
ently regarded the DOJ's supporting evidence as insuffi-
ciently specific. The judge decided, however, that, even if
it had been specific, it could not "meet the theoretical ob-
jection that a potentially unlimited number of commuters
or other new entrants may be available to discipline the
market. ' 63 Given a reading of the law which requires
merger opponents to prove that new entry is unlikely in
markets where the merger has eliminated a competitive
service, the judge's conclusion seems inescapable.64 In
the absence of traditional barriers, it is easy to imagine
arguably plausible scenarios for new entry in any particu-
lar market.
The DOT expressly rejected the judge's evaluation of
the plight of airline merger opponents.65 In analyzing the
effects of proposed mergers, noted the Department, its at-
tention is focused primarily on factors affecting competi-
tion. The chief factors, according to DOT, "are entry
barriers, which include 'a wide range of factors that could
cause unacceptable delays in competitive activity, even if
- Id. at 20. Here the judge further commented:
We accept the submission by Justice . . . that competition must be
assessed and maintained in individual city pair markets and not
merely in the national market (as argued by the applicant) in order
to vitiate anticompetitive assertions. We also accept the Justice De-
partment's contention that it may not be possible to replicate Re-
public's hub at MSP [Minneapolis-St. Paul] within two years.
However, these pyrrhic proofs cannot overcome the theoretical pre-
sumption of unlimited open entry by potential competitors and the
statutory presumption of innocence ascribed to mergers under the
Deregulation Act.
- A slightly different reading of the law would, of course, produce very differ-
ent results: "If the burden of showing the absence of anticompetitive effects were
shifted to applicants, we would conclude that the merger should not be approved,
since the applicants have not proven the likelihood of entry in certain city pairs,
any more than opponents have proven the likelihood of non-entry." Id. at 14.
i- NWA-Republic Acquisition Case, DOT Order No. 86-7-81, 7 (July 31, 1986)
(stating that the ALJ "seriously overstated the magnitude of the burden and the
difficulty in meeting it").
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the conditions are not irremediable over the long
term.' ",66 Accordingly:
[O]pponents are not required to prove that entry will be
impossible, or that the firms remaining in a market will be
able to exercise market power after a merger. Nor are
they required to overcome some "theoretical presumption
of unlimited open entry."... What we do require is a fac-
tual basis that allows us to evaluate entry conditions, to
assess possible impediments to entry, and to weigh these
factors against various pro-competitive factors that we
know, from experience and from the record, are operative
in most airline markets. If such impediments make entry
in response to supracompetitive pricing unlikely (or if they
can be expected to delay such entry materially), then a
transaction that eliminates actual competition in markets
where those conditions exist must be disapproved.67
In the NA-Republic case, the DOT concluded that
merger opponents had not shown that entrants would be
unable to establish new hubs to provide sufficient "feed
traffic" to support new competition at all MSP points.
The DOT also found that "every [affected] city-pair mar-
ket should be subject to multiple forms of entry," so that
competitive forces, "especially when considered together,
should limit attempts to exercise market power."' 6 In this
connection, the Department listed the following sources
of competitive discipline which had been noted by the
judge in his market-by-market analysis:
(1) actual competition or new entry by carriers with hubs
at the other endpoints of the MSP routes, (2) actual and
potential competition with one-stop and connecting ser-
vice through intermediate hubs, (3) potential entry by car-
riers without hubs in eleven of the city pairs that have
large amounts of local traffic and that therefore, in the
AL's view, can be served by carriers without feed traffic,
(4) potential entry by carriers with tag-end flights, (5) en-
.. Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
67 Id. at 7. The DOT regarded the establishment of a new small hub at MSP by
a large carrier as both "feasible and likely" after this merger. Id. at 19.
- Id. at 16.
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try into many of the shorter, thinner markets by commuter
carriers, (6) entry by carriers with lower operating costs,
and (7) entry by carriers that already operate at both
69endpoints.
Considering all these possibilities, it appears that an op-
ponent would indeed have a hard time proving that post-
merger new entry would be unlikely. Except for its partic-
ular emphasis on the significance of "material delay" of
entry, as distinguished from permanent entry barriers,70
the Department's reading of the law seems to be remarka-
bly similar to that of the judge.
The second case, whose central issue was "whether a
combination of two carriers hubbing at the same city is
likely to substantially reduce competition,"' 7' concerned
the acquisition of Ozark Airlines by TWA, both of which
operated hubs at St. Louis.72 These carriers competed
nonstop on thirty city-pair routes, nineteen of which had
no other nonstop services. In forty-one other St. Louis
city pairs, either Ozark or TWA (but not both) operated
nonstop. Here again, the DOT justified approval of the
transaction by pointing out that there were no apparent
obstacles which would prevent the "timely" establishment
of a new hub at St. Louis 73 and that, even should this not
occur, non-hub services could provide adequate competi-
tive discipline.7 4 Thus, in neither of these cases did the
Department find that the merger of two carriers with hubs
at the same city would substantially reduce competition in
all cases where the available airport facilities were inade-
quate to accommodate a new, competitive hub service.
The crucial question was whether new entrants would be
prevented from entering any "affected city-pair markets
within a reasonable period of time (two years) in response
w, Id. "Tag-end flights" are defined as "those in which the operating carrier
does not have a hub at either endpoint." Id. at 18.
"I See text accompanying supra note 67.
7' TWA-Ozark Acquisition Case, DOT Order No. 86-9-29, 2 (Sept. 12, 1986).
72 Id.
7:1 Id. at 3.
7- Id. at 7-8.
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to an attempt by the combined TWA and Ozark to raise
prices above competitive levels."' 75 The inability to estab-
lish a hub would not necessarily have this effect.
Market access was again the crucial issue in the Texas Air
Eastern Acquisition Case.7 6 Here the markets concerned a
specific type of service - "shuttle" service - between
two specific airport pairs, Washington National (DCA)
and Laguardia (LGA), and LGA and Logan (BOS). East-
ern Airlines and Texas Air (through its subsidiary, New
York Air) provided the only shuttle-type service in these
two markets and both LGA and DCA were (and are) "slot-
controlled" under the FAA high-density rule.77 The DOT
held that, unless adequate facilities for a competitive shut-
tle service were provided, the merger would substantially
reduce competition in both the DCA-LGA and the LGA-
BOS shuttle markets.78 Accordingly, it approved the
transaction only after Texas Air had made agreements en-
abling Pan American to obtain enough slots at DCA and
LGA to operate fifteen daily round-trip flights in each of
the shuttle markets.79
To differentiate shuttle service from other services be-
tween the same points, the DOT declared that many busi-
ness travellers do not regard the non-shuttle operations
as a "practicable alternative" because they are more time-
consuming and more costly, and that a large proportion
of the shuttle traffic consisted of this class of traveller.8 0
The Department placed particular emphasis on evidence
showing that the levels of fares charged at other airports
did not affect the level of the shuttle fares.81 However, no
attempt was made to state the precise criterion which the
75 Id. at 6.
7,; Texas Air-Eastern Acquisition Order to Show Cause, DOT Order No. 86-7-
21 (July 9, 1986).
77 See 14 C.F.R. § 93-123 (1987). At slot-controlled airports, rights to specific
times for take-off and landing are allocated among carriers on a long-term basis.
78 Texas Air-Eastern Show Cause, Order No. 86-7-21, at 15-16.




Department believed to be appropriate for the delineation
of the boundaries of a given market. There was, for ex-
ample, no indication of how quickly and to what extent
the price within the market in question would have to re-
act to the "outside" price changes in order to call in ques-
tion the existence of the separate "inner market," and
thus to suggest that the elimination of competition within
it was not a substantial reduction of competition after
all."2 In this respect, the Department's position is remi-
niscent of the traditional method of judging the anticom-
petitive impact of mergers by using concentration ratios,
where the legality of a transaction hinged on an essen-
tially arbitrary market definition. a
Defining the market was also an important issue in con-
nection with another acquisition, by Texas Air which fol-
lowed hard upon the heels of Texas Air-Eastern. Like Texas
Air-Eastern this merger involved a substantial competitive
overlap in the northeast transportation corridor. Here,
Texas Air proposed to merge People Express into a newly
formed subsidiary and to acquire most of the remaining
assets (including a leasehold interest in fifteen gates at the
main Denver airport) of People's bankrupt subsidiary,
Frontier Airlines.8 4 People Express itself was in dire fi-
nancial straits with no apparent prospect of any improve-
ment. 5 Approval of the merger did not, however, result
from the application of the "failing company" defense. 6
The extensive competitive overlap between the merger
participants was not in dispute. There were seventeen
82 The DOT simply stated that "the key question in deciding whether services
are in the same market is whether (and to what extent) the prices for one service
respond to changes in prices for the other service." Id. (citations omitted).
11 See, e.g., Keyes, Proposals for the Control of Conglomerate Mergers, 34 S. ECON. J.
67 (1967).
84 Texas Air-People Express Acquisition Show Cause, DOT Order No. 86-10-
26, 4 (Oct. 14, 1986).
" Texas Air-People Express Acquisition, Final Order, DOT Order No. 86-10-
53, 6 (Oct. 24, 1986).
- The applicants failed to provide adequate information to enable the DOT to
consider the merger under the "failing company" doctrine, so the DOT evaluated
the merger in the competition analysis framework. Texas Air-People Express Show
Cause, Order No. 86-10-26, at 9.
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nonstop markets in which People Express and one of the
two Texas Air affiliates (New York Air or Eastern) were
currently competing. Of these, sixteen had one endpoint
at New York City.8 7 In its preliminary tentative decision
to approve the merger, the DOT clearly indicated that en-
try conditions, and especially any airport access con-
straints affecting these conditions, would be the decisive
factors determining the prospective merger's anticompe-
titive effect. "With the exception of slot constraints at
DCA [Washington National]," noted the DOT, "resolu-
tion of the question of whether Texas Air's acquisition of
People Express will lessen competition depends on
whether there are any impediments to entry at New York,
and that question turns on entry conditions at EWR [New-
ark]." ' Newark was the only available access point to the
New York market other than LGA and Kennedy (JFK),
both of which were at least partially subject to slot restric-
tions under the high-density rule. The slot controls at
DCA would not be a problem, in the agency's opinion,
because entry at Washington's Dulles International Air-
port (IAD) .was not constrained. 9
In the end, despite the fact that the would-be merger
participants accounted for roughly sixty percent of the
service in the crowded northeast corridor markets (New
York-Washington and New York-Boston), the agency con-
cluded that the merger would not substantially reduce
competition because expansion or entry was possible in at
least one airport in each of the three cities.90 This conclu-
sion, in turn, depended upon a finding that Newark "had,
or will soon have, adequate facilities and air traffic capac-
ity to accommodate carriers desiring to enter or expand
operations in the New York markets." 9' Outside the
northeast corridor, concern about possible anticompeti-
81 Texas Air-People Express Final Order, Order No. 86-10-53, at 9.
Texas Air-People Express Show Cause, Order No. 86-10-26, at 14.




tive affects had centered on Denver's Stapleton Airport
where it was feared that the acquisition of a large propor-
tion of scarce gate space by a dominant competitor (Texas
Air) could substantially increase "potential entrants' diffi-
culties in obtaining access to the necessary facilities." 92
Here the Department was able to obtain evidence con-
vincing it that there was no prospect of a future shortage
of gate space.9 3
Within the northeast corridor, however, there was an-
other special problem area. In the EWR-DCA route, the
only suppliers of nonstop service were New York Air and
People Express, and access to DCA was undeniably lim-
ited by slot control. The Department dealt with this diffi-
culty by the use of two lines of argument: (1) that the
EWR-DCA route was not a separate market or submarket;
and (2) that even if it were a separate market, the acquisi-
tion would not substantially reduce competition because
other carriers would be able to begin competitive service.
In support of the first argument, the DOT stretched its
concept of the "market" to its logical extreme. "A spe-
cific airport pair," it declared, "will constitute a separate
market if there is a large number of travellers who will
rarely consider using alternative airports and if the carri-
ers serving that airport pair can therefore disregard the level
of fares and service offered at other airports, in determining their
fares and service levels." 94 The DOT went on to state:
We recognize that Newark and Washington National ap-
pear to be the most desirable airports for many travellers
between the New York and Washington metropolitan ar-
eas and that in recent years many passengers have used
DCA-EWR flights. We see no basis for concluding that
these airport preferences will enable a carrier on the DCA-
EWR route to ignore the fares and service provided in other New
York- Washington city pairs.95
92 Texas Air-People Express Show Cause, Order No. 86-10-26, at 20.
93 Texas Air-People Express Show Cause, Order No. 86-10-53, at 18.
Id. at 16 (emphasis added.)
9-5 Id. (emphasis added.)
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Thus, any substitutability, however slight, with a service
outside the boundary of a designated product group will
apparently suffice to destroy the group's "market" status.
This formulation provides an illuminating contrast with
that in Northwest-Republic. In that case, market definition
was based on whether:
products are sufficiently substitutable so that prices for the
first have a strong influence on prices for the second, one
cannot ignore a product once it is excluded from the market ...
even if a 'product' such as ground transportation or con-
necting service is excluded from the market, one should
nevertheless consider whether and to what extent that
product can have a meaningful impact on the prices that
are charged for the product that remains in the market.96
The DOT's second argument was supported by the use
of a similarly elastic view of the "entry barrier" concept.
Even though tight slot restrictions existed at DCA, it was
held that the required "discipline" could be maintained
by other carriers already present at that airport, which
could divert capacity into the DCA-EWR route, and by the
purchase or lease of additional slots from carriers already
holding them. 97 The situation on this route was distin-
guished from the shuttle routes case by the larger number
of slots required to compete effectively in the latter.
However, this distinction seems to be questionable on at
least two grounds: (1) an effective disciplining of any mar-
ket would seem to require the ability to enter (and to op-
erate) on a more than minimal scale (relative to the size of
the market); and, (2) it is presumably always possible to
acquire any number of the existing slots anywhere at some
price.
In short, the defining characteristic of an "entry bar-
rier" which makes it sufficiently "high" to compel rejec-
tion of an airline merger is not made at all clear. The
same can be said of the defining characteristic of a "mar-
ket" which gives "power" to the firm which dominates it.
9, NWA-Republic, Order No. 87-7-81, at 9 (emphasis added.)
97 Texas Air-People Express Final Order, Order No. 86-10-53, at 17-18.
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To serve the purpose intended by the DOT, the term
"barrier to entry into a market" would not only have to be
definite in meaning, but also to be defined in such a way
so as to identify factors known to produce "substantial"
harm to market participants. The latter requirement
would obviously be far more difficult to meet, and the
DOT's suggested two-year delay of entry does not fill the
bill.
Delta Airlines' acquisition of Western Airlines98 raised
no new or difficult issues related to anticompetitive im-
pact. The route overlap between the participants was min-
imal and in these markets the Department saw "no
evidence of barriers that would prevent other carriers
from providing competitive service." 99 Moreover, the
merging carriers' combined share of the airport facilities
at hubs served by both was not enough to threaten access
by others even if these facilities had been especially
scarce, which did not appear to be the case.100 It does ap-
pear, however, that there may have been a real probability
of future competition between the two carriers, but there
was ample precedent for ignoring this consideration.
THE "NATIONAL MARKET"
In accordance with long-standing precedent, the De-
partment also considered the effect of the Delta-Western
transaction on concentration in the "national market" for
scheduled passenger air transportation. This analysis re-
quires the DOT to consider the merger's effect on the dis-
tribution of the national output of this product among all
carriers. Although national concentration was by this
time verging on levels normally attracting concern under
the Justice Department's guidelines for mergers, 10 this
98 Delta-Western Acquisition Case Show Cause, DOT Order No. 86-10-44 (Oct.
23, 1986).
I., d. at 6.
,00 Id. at 7-8.
-1 Department ofJustice 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984).
When evaluating the national market, the DOJ uses the Herfindahl-Hirshman In-
dex (HHI). The HHI provides a statistical model of the concentration of an in-
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transaction, because of the relatively small size of one par-
ticipant, would have escaped challenge under the antitrust
laws, even if the DOJ had taken the view that the "national
market" existed. 10 2
Recent mergers with large quantitative impact have also
been subjected to the DOJ tests and found to be harmless.
For the Texas-Eastern merger, which was expected to
make Texas Air the nation's largest carrier, accounting for
16.8 percent of the total national revenue passenger
miles, the Transportation Department had estimated that
the post-merger Herfindahl-Hirshmam Index (HHI) 10 3
value would be below 1000.104 The effect of the Texas-
People combination, which would have increased the na-
tional HHI from 1023.4 to 1140.8 if the traffic of both
carriers had continued to match pre-merger levels, was
discounted because People's dismal business prospects
made such continuance highly unlikely.'0 5
Having inherited from the CAB the custom of including
in its merger opinions assessments of the proposal's effect
on the national concentration of airline output, 0 6 the
DOT has carried this practice on without explaining the
official theory of the relationship between these effects
and the actual anticompetitive impact of the transactions
dealt with. The nation's whole output of scheduled pas-
senger air transportation is certainly not all in one market,
dustry by summing the squares of the market shares of the resident firms. Id. at
26,830-3 1. A monopolistic industry would have an HHI value of 10,000, while an
atomistic industry would have an HHI value approaching zero. Id. at 26,831 n. 13.
(monopolistic industy has only one firm with a 100% market share, 100 X 100 =
10,000). The DOJ uses the HHI to determine the effect a merger will have on the
concentration of the industry by calculating the HHI of the industry before and
after the merger. Id. at 26,831. If the post merger HHI is below 1000, the DOJ
will generally not challenge the merger, a post merger HHI of 1000 to 1800 may
draw a challenge, and a post merger HHI of greater than 1800 will probably draw
a challenge. Id.
0l2 Delta-Western Show Cause, Order No. 86-10-44, at 5-6.
103 See supra note 101 for an explanation of the application of the Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index.
104 Texas Air-Eastern Show Cause, Order No. 86-71-21, at 10.
-5 Texas Air-People Express Show Cause, Order No. 86-10-26, at 12-13.
- Southwest-Muse, Order No. 85-5-28, at 9.
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if "market" is defined in terms of ready substitutability of
products or cross-elasticities of demand. As has been
seen, it is this type of definition that the Department has
appeared to favor in connection with city-pair services.
It has been said that the "national market is analyzed
because the Department recognizes that the basic industry
assets, airplanes, are highly mobile and that entry barriers
are low.' 0 7 This comment suggests that the Department
may believe that national concentration may bring about
"substantial reduction of competition" because of a scar-
city of existing carriers (as distinguished from possible new
operators) capable of entering the markets of others who
seek to raise prices or reduce the quality of service. But
such a position would be inconsistent with the agency's
general view that "substantial reduction of competition"
can occur only if there is some factor which will prevent
the beginning of new competition for a minimum of two
years. Experience indicates that the launching of a new
airline does not take that long. From the Department's
point of view, therefore, even a merger creating one com-
prehensive national air carrier would not necessarily im-
ply a "substantial reduction of competition" in any airline
market. Provided that access to each "market" could be
obtained within a two-year period, there would in fact be
no such reduction. As the Department has reminded us,
it would not be necessary for the same new entrant to com-
pete in all the affected markets. Because of the elusive na-
ture of the "market" concept, however, the exact meaning
of the proviso remains in doubt.
CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH
As the example of the "national market" suggests, the
DOT's working criterion for "substantial reduction of
competition" leaves much to be desired. Under the law, a
finding of "substantial reduction of competition" in con-
" TWA-Ozark Acquisition Case, Recommended Decision of the Administra-
tive Law Judge, DOT Docket No. 43,837 (August 7, 1986) at 11.
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nection with a proposed merger means that the merger
must be disapproved unless it can pass a rigorous test.
This test requires a showing that the transaction will pro-
duce certain benefits which outweigh its anticompetitive
effects. In this context, the regulatory criterion must be
able to indicate whether the merger is or is not likely to
cause economic performance to deteriorate to such an ex-
tent that this test should be run. The DOT criterion is
unsatisfactory because it cannot be relied upon to per-
form this task.
First, the criterion does not take into account the an-
ticompetitive effect of removing an existing competitor,
irrespective of whether or not there are obstacles to entry.
While the Department may well be right in believing that
this removal will typically result in only a small percentage
increase in price for each unit of output, 0 8 the aggregate
effect in a large market, or in many smaller markets (for
example, as in Northwest-Republic) could be quite substan-
tial. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that the quality
of service (at any given price) will decrease when an ex-
isting rival seller is eliminated. The aggregate effect will,
of course, vary directly with the period of time which
elapses before a new entrant appears. However, there is
no reason to assume that the effect is always negligible if
this time period is less than two years.
As was noted above, in connection with Southwest-Muse,
the Department has also refused to take into account the
effect of removing a potential competitor except under re-
strictive conditions that do not seem justified. However,
if the DOT view on direct competition is accepted, then it
is evidently easy to justify ignoring the state of potential
competition to the same extent.
It has been suggested that the DOT view on elimination
of competition is an integral part of the rationale of the
Deregulation Act. To justify this law, in other words, it is
necessary to argue that, in the absence of obstacles to en-
'" See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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try, unregulated market forces will produce "optimum"
economic results (usually defined so as to imply the equal-
ity of price with marginal cost) in all airline markets, in-
cluding those which contain only one firm. This
argument is not only unnecessary to support deregula-
tion; it is evidently misguided.
The fact is that neither existing nor potential competi-
tion can be expected to produce "optimum" results in air-
line markets, or in the vast majority of other markets,
regulated or unregulated. Examples of "perfect competi-
tion" and "perfect contestability" are not abundant in the
real world. For reasons which cannot be dealt with here,
there is no good case for trying to bring these results
about by governmental action. The Deregulation Act can-
not and need not be justified by arguing that it will realize
an economic "ideal." What it does promise is the removal
of the obviously undesirable effects of protective regula-
tion, notably excessive airline operating costs and unre-
sponsiveness to consumer demand. By maintaining
competition, antitrust-type merger regulation can help to
prevent the reappearance of these economic evils.
Second, there is no reason to assume that the expected
"reduction of competition" caused by eliminating a com-
petitor suddenly becomes "substantial" if it is likely that
there will be a two-year delay in entry. For example, if the
affected market is quite small, the anticompetitive effect
could still be quite small also. Of course, this objection
does not apply exclusively to a two-year cut-off point. It is
equally applicable to any similarly time-determined test
for "substantiality."
Third, the operational content of the criterion depends
crucially upon a method of defining the market which is
neither clear in meaning nor defended by economic argu-
ment, and is therefore subject to different interpretations
in any particular case. This ambiguity has important im-
plications, because entry conditions in individual "mar-
kets" are the factors which are held to determine whether
or not there will be "substantial reduction of competi-
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tion." The way in which markets are defined, which is sig-
nificantly discretionary, may often decide the fate of
particular merger proposals. (Consider, for example, the
importance of market definition in Texas Air-People.)
The practical application of the DOT criterion has
served to justify approval of an impressive number of
mergers between airlines, including some companies
which were competitive or potentially competitive in
many markets. In only one major case (Texas Air-East-
ern),' 0 9 which involved "traditional entry barriers," was it
necessary to require an important change in a proposal
before it could be approved. If the above analysis is cor-
rect, some of the approved transactions were in fact capa-
ble of producing significant anticompetitive effects. As
has been noted, termination of special regulatory treat-
ment of airline mergers, which may occur in the near fu-
ture, cannot be expected to produce any substantial
change in policy.
I', See supra notes 76 to 83 and accompanying text.
